BOOK REVIEW

Canadian Scholars on Criminal Responsibility

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Abstract This short review examines the work of four Canadian scholars addressing a variety of questions about criminal responsibility. The essays under review are a small part of a recent collection of essays entitled "Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law."

Keywords Criminal responsibility \cdot Voluntary act requirement \cdot Control \cdot Mental disorder \cdot Insanity \cdot Diminished capacity

Editors François Tanguay-Renaud and James Stribopoulos have put together a wonderful collection of essays on the criminal law from a terrific group of Canadian scholars, who treat the reader to thought-provoking ideas and arguments on a wide range of subjects. The collection is divided into three parts. The first deals with domestic substantive law; the second with domestic procedure; and the last with international law.

The problem with reviewing a collection of such breadth is of course that its contributions reach beyond the reviewer's competence, or at least this reviewer's competence. In order to stay within my comfort zone I limit my comments to the contributions in the first part gathered together under the heading "New Perspectives on Exculpation." I leave it to others to comment on the contributions contained in the other parts. But if the essays on which I comment are any evidence, careful attention to the others will yield benefits well worth the investment.

Replacing the Voluntary Act Requirement

Andrew Botterell's "Understanding the Voluntary Act Principle" urges criminal-law theorists to stop saying that the "voluntary act principle," according to which "criminal

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