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مجموعه مقالات اقتصاد سیاسی قانون اساسی 1392
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  • the paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration

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    • تاریخ ارائه: 1392/07/24
    • تاریخ انتشار در تی پی بین: 1392/07/24
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     in his 1960 seminal contribution to game theory and its applications, the strategy of conflict, thomas schelling suggested that in international negotiations, strong international opposition may be an asset rather than a liability. rather than constraining it, the opposition would enlarge the opportunity set thus making it easier to successfully conclude international negotiations. this property, which is also known as the schelling-conjecture, shares some aspects with constitutional economics, namely the two-level approach suggesting that it might be beneficial for all parties to give up some power by tying one’s hands. in this paper we examine by means of a simulation study how far we can take this notion in the politics of trade integration. in explicitly marrying schelling’s 1960 idea with the 1988 two-level approach by putnam and embedding the result into the political economy of trade we find that the threat of a domestic opposition or national institution having a veto power frequently but not always delivers a more favorable outcome for the respective trade representative at the international table. whether the schelling-conjecture applies or not actually depends on the subtle interplay of a “bully effect” and a “serenity effect”.

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