• on the irrationality of mind-uploading: a rely to neil levy

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    • تاریخ ارائه: 1392/07/24
    • تاریخ انتشار در تی پی بین: 1392/07/24
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     in a paper in this journal, neil levy challenges nicholas agar’s argument for the irrationality of mind-uploading. mind-uploading is a futuristic process that involves scanning brains and recording relevant information which is then transferred into a computer. its advocates suppose that mind-uploading transfers both human minds and identities from biological brains into computers. according to agar’s original argument, mind-uploading is prudentially irrational. success relies on the soundness of the program of strong ai—the view that it may someday be possible to build a computer that is capable of thought. strong ai may in fact be false, an eventuality with dire consequences for mind-uploading. levy argues that agar’s argument relies on mistakes about the probability of failed mind-uploading and underestimates what is to be gained from successfully mind-uploading. this paper clarifies agar’s original claims about the likelihood of mind-uploading failure and offers further defense of a pessimistic evaluation of success.

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