• veto players and foreign aid provision

    نویسندگان :
    جزئیات بیشتر مقاله
    • تاریخ ارائه: 1392/07/24
    • تاریخ انتشار در تی پی بین: 1392/07/24
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     this study investigates how the political institutions of developed economies influence their foreign assistance. specifically, we argue that the number of effective veto players has a negative effect on the volume of aid provision. to provide foreign assistance, the incumbent government in a donor country must have unanimous support from all effective veto players in policy making. thus, it has more barriers to overcome when the polity is characterized by many and preference-wise heterogeneous veto players. by examining the official development assistance outflows of 27 oecd countries for the period of 1977–2006, we find empirical patterns that corroborate our argument.

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